GETRUNTAH

New Papers on Virtue Epistemology Epistemic Luck Value of Knowledge etc

My apologies for neglecting my blog! If it were a child, someone would have taken it away from me. I need to get back into the habit. In a feeble effort to make up for some lost time, I have gotten around finally to putting my latest work on VE, epistemic luck, and epistemic value (and other areas of epistemology) up online. You can download them from my homepage at http://jadamcarter.googlepages.com

As most of these are works in progress, please cite only by permission. Also, I am of course very happy to have any comments/feedback on any of this. Feedback is welcome both on this blog or by e-mailing me at j.a.carter@ed.ac.uk

In the meantime, Im stoked to be leaving tomorrow morning for the star-studded Epistemic Agency conference in Geneva...

Cheers, Adam

Available link for download

New Draft Luck and Credit in the Space of Reasons

Greetings: Below is a link to a rough draft of a paper Ive recently written on McDowells epistemology; the paper charges his account with failing two anti-luck desiderata.


Warning: I am not entirely satisfied with this paper; thanks to some recent suggestions, I am aware that my section on perceptual-recognitional abilities needs amended. (Also, I need to re-think some other claims I make). Ive decided to post it nonetheless, in case others wish to consider the nascent arguments and/or or provide any comments.

Here is the abstract, and below is a link to the paper:

ABSTRACT: This essay will advance the view that the McDowellian theory of knowledge fails to satisfy the requirements of an adequate anti-luck epistemology. Section 1 presents two twin anti-luck desiderata that, I shall argue, an account must accomodate: (i) If S knows p, then S could not have easily been wrong that p; (ii) If S knows p, then S is credit-worthy for her true belief that p. In Section 2, I outline the salient differences between McDowell’s iconoclastic anti-luck strategy and traditional strategies. Section 3 offers reasons for thinking that McDowell fails to satisfy what I have presented as the first anti-luck desideratum; section 4 offers reasons for thinking that McDowell fails the second desideratum.


http://staff.stir.ac.uk/adam.carter/documents/luckandcreditWednesdayevening14feb.pdf

Available link for download